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Introduction
Professor da Costa’s Ensaio sobre os fundamentos da lógica1 constitutes a
major contribution to the philosophy of logic. It’s a stimulating, provocative book,
putting forward many original ideas, tackling a number of important if intricate
issues in the field, and, to myself at least, suggesting how to open new ways in
metalogical research. The book does not set forth any metalogical system. In fact,
it is more a collection of essays than a systematic account of problems in the
philosophy of logic. As the author himself puts it in the foreword, there may be
incongruities between different parts of the book, since it has been written over a
number of years and has originated in notes used for courses and seminars. The
reader may well regret that the great Brazilian logician should have gone about
editing those notes without first devoting a more strenuous effort to reshaping those
outlines. and somehow making them into a more encompassing, and cohesive treatise
on the subject. Nevertheless, I think there is a deeper ground for da Costa’s failing
to do so: he regards the philosophy of logic, and philosophy in general, as a field
wherein we lack clear-cut and sure criteria and principles, so much so that, for us
to aim at a systematic, well-organized, formalizable account of philosophical
problems would be to embark in a speculative philosophy, turning our backs on the
unavoidably piecemeal task of setting up a constructive, positive philosophy, which
contents itself with tentative, partial elucidations, tied up with results of other
sciences.
§1.— Verificationist positivism
The underlying doctrine which — not consequently enough to my mind —
emerges throughout the book is a verificationist view, according to which to be true
is to be ascertainable and nothing else. This is why da Costa shows himself highly
sympathetic towards intuitionism. On the other hand, though, he cleaves to excluded
1Newton C.A. da Costa, Ensaio sobre os fundamentos da lógica, São Paulo: Editorial Hucitec, 1979.
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middle, groping not very successfully, I’m afraid — at a justification of this principle
from the standpoint of a pragmatistic verificationism.
A telling illustration of da Costa’s verificationism is his conception of
objects of a mathematical theory as having only those properties they are assigned
in virtue of the axioms and inference-rules of the theory under consideration. This
is a recurrent claim (cf. particularly pp. 87-93). So, e.g., the axioms of ZF serve to
define the notion of set. Nevertheless, there are other definitions of that notion,
which are provided by alternative set-theories. Similarly — as we’re going to see
below, in §4 — negation can be defined in several, alternative ways, incompatible
with one another. But that alternativeness doesn’t bother da Costa: there’s a
plurivocity of ‘negation’, of ‘set’, and so on, and, when passing from some theory
to an alternative one, we are in fact defining something different, even if closely
related or akin. The reader may find such accounts of discrepancies between theories
fairly puzzling; for, cannot a similar account be given as regards alternative physical
or sociological theories? Then there would be no discrepancy proper, and, as a result,
scientific discussions would be pointless.
As against that kind of indeterminacy — inter-systematic indeterminacy —
there’s an indeterminacy, though, which, according to da Costa, is provably unelim-
inable: some expected properties of sets are not just unprovable, but provably
unprovable in ZF — e.g. the axiom of choice, the cardinality of the continuum and
so on — (provided ZF is consistent), even though they also happen to be provably
irrefutable within ZF (with the same proviso, of course). Let me call it ‘intra-sys-
tematic indeterminacy’.
I find, though, some wavering in da Costa’s position. On the one hand, he
seems to uphold an indeterminacy thesis — Zermelian sets neither would comply with
the axiom of choice nor would fail to do so —; on the other, he seems to favour an
ontological relativism according to which for some extensions of ZF, Zermelian sets
comply with the axiom of choice, whereas for other extensions they don’t (cf. p. 88,
where what is at issue is the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem’s bearing on determinacy
of Zermelian sets). Probably, da Costa identifies indeterminacy with relativity, since
he thinks that the principle of excluded middle is needful in most contexts — and
therefore part and parcel of systems of logic adequate to most scientific purposes.
Accordingly, indeterminacy only means relativity: instead of cleaving to ZF as such,
we ought to choose either ZF + axiom of choice, or else ZF + the negation of that
axiom. and as much would to be said concerning any other indeterminacy result.
Were my interpretation of da Costa’s opinion correct, then all indeterminacy would
after all reduce to the inter-systematic kind thereof.
Related to that issue is da Costa’s discussion of Kreisel’s comment on the
significance of theorems of indeterminacy concerning the continuum hypothesis. For
Kreisel, there’s no objective indeterminacy, since, once we have fixed the cardinality
of any normal model of ZF, that model is isomorphic with any other model of the
same cardinality; hence, in any two such models there is just one aleph equal to the
continuum’s cardinal. Da Costa replies that the objective indeterminacy still stays,
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since there remains some relativity with respect to the chosen model’s cardinality.
Da Costa’s point is probably well taken, but I cannot subscribe to his conclusion. To
myself, all that has been proved is, not that Zermelian sets are indeterminate with
respect to certain properties or that they have, or respectively lack, those properties
only relatively to some particular extension or other of ZF, but that, if all we know
about sets is what ZF tells us, then we don’t know whether sets have those
properties or not. Nonetheless, da Costa would reject that remark, since it relies on
an ‘extreme platonism’ as he calls it. We’re going to see (in §3 below) that his own
platonism is far from extreme.
I find another ground for regarding da Costa’s view as verificationist in his
rejection of realism: against Aristotle, da Costa somehow espouses (pp. 77-8) Kant’s
opinion that. instead of being governed by the objects, our knowledge is governed
by the subject’s a priori ‘puttings’, although, unlike Kant, da Costa thinks that those
a priori postulations are not unchangeable, but vary a good deal according to the
intellectual circumstances — ultimately, pragmatic ones. (Moreover, our knowledge
is not merely our creation, but stems from an interaction between the external world
and a priori cognitive structure; see p. 121.) So, it is us who determine, through our
postulations, such theses as we want to call ‘logical truths’. and this seems also to
hold for metalogical theses, also. This is why da Costa says (on p. 95) that logical
realism or platonism is unscientific and speculative, in that we lack any more or less
sure criterion allowing us to know whether or not objects postulated by platonism
have certain properties independently of their being assigned them by some particular
theory.
Owing to that dominant trend towards verificationism, it’s far from
surprising that da Costa’s view reveals itself positivist (cf. pp. 5, 7 ff., 60 ff., 225).
Da Costa’s positivism contains these five tenets:
(1) no method is allowed except reason, analysis, hypothetical models and appeals
to real sciences and to historical criticism;
(2) problems dealt with must be amenable to objective criteria — a criterion being
objective insomuch as it yields a clear-curt test or decision procedure;
(3) philosophy has no real content of this own (i.e. philosophy says nothing about
reality which is not said by some particular science or other), its only task
being a research about problems of particular sciences;
(4) philosophers ought to keep their researches independent of politics, religion,
speculative philosophy or, for that matter, any other human activity except
science;
(5) no metaphysical doctrine about reality is to be countenanced — particularly, no
metaphysical theory is to be drawn from either language or logic (cf. p.
177): da Costa identifies — mistakenly, I dare say — every logical or
mathematical theory with a language, and argues that use of language is
compatible with conflicting metaphysical views, whence it would, according
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to him, follow that logical and mathematical theories are ontologically
neutral.
Moreover, da Costa’s positivism is ‘dialectical’ — that is the word he uses
— in that he grants no definitive value to any statement or theory, not even to
scientific methods; when we assert something, we ought to do so in such a way that
me take our assertion to be provisional, not true as such, but a mere approximation
to truth.
I find all those claims highly exceptionable. Claim (1) seems to me too
ambiguous and therefore hard to assess in any satisfactorily rigorous or accurate
way. Claim (2) stems from verificationism which, among many other difficulties,
faces this one: were it true, the claim could not be verified — there being no decision
procedure for us to know whether or not it is true. Claim (3) is belied by da Costa’s
own metaphysics, platonistic after a fashion (see below, §3 of this paper); moreover,
the problem of whether or not philosophy has real content of its own is dealt with
by no particular science at all, and then the claim itself is non-positive — which by
the way is the fate befalling all those claims. Claim (4) is by no means uncontrover-
sial, and it can be contended that, willy-nilly, every philosopher — or even any
scientist, for that matter — pursues his research taking as his start-point an
assumption framework, an outlook which contains, or is conditioned by, values,
attitudes, as well as staunch beliefs which we call ‘intuitions’ (see below, §2).
And claim (5) seems to me mistaken, since a theory is not a language, and
when asserting some theory’s theorems we commit ourselves to the existence or
nonexistence of whatever a theorem says exists or, respectively, fails to exist. The
latter point is of foremost significance, since, when I state ‘There is nothing such
that…’, I commit myself to the fact that nothing is such that…, which is a negative-
existential commitment. However, people have become worried with positive-
existential commitments alone, which has resulted in carelessness about the
ontological import of statements of the form ‘All entities are such that…’ (i.e. ‘There
doesn’t exist anything such that not…’). Therefore, it’s not enough to give up the EG
rule in order to set rid of any ontological commitment, for, by stating universally
quantified sentences, you commit yourselves ontologically, too; only your
commitment is negative, which notwithstanding it remains an ontological commit-
ment all the same.
As for the so-called dialectization of theories, I deem da Costa’s a little
cloudy statements are self-refuting, not because the statements themselves become
liable to revision — that doesn’t make them false —, but because, if I understand
rightly what da Costa means, no statement can be asserted as true, but only as more
or less near to truth (notice, though, that being more or less near to truth is by no
means the same as being more or less true; degrees of truth are not degrees of
proximity to truth). Da Costa’s view of dialectics seems to me to mistake lack of
truth guaranties for lack of truth — a confusion ensuant upon verificationism. For, our
being unable to bear out our statements with such clinching arguments as rely only
on premises whose evidence does undeniably lie beyond any reasonable dispute or
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challenge nowise shows our statements to be false; it only shows them to be not
radically justified. (Now, what we might draw as a conclusion from that lack of
radical justification is that knowledge is, merely, true belief, and nothing else.)
§2.— Da Costa’s Pragmatist Intuitivism
According to da Costa, the ultimate justification of rational principles and
methods of operation is pragmatic: without resorting to them, we should go irrational
(cf. pp. 221-2 & p. 233), i.e. we should be stranded on situations pragmatically
absurd (cf. p. 234). But why should we endeavour to escape that fate? Da Costa does
not try to answer that question; in fact he does not even bring it up. Probably he
thinks questions of that kind lie outside the scope of a positive philosophy: since
there can be no verifiable answers to them, the questions themselves lack sense.
So, our metalogical research is, according to da Costa, conditioned by an
unshakable presupposition, which we cannot tare to question: the need for rational
principles and methods. But those principles, which have an unchangeable core, are
not theses of logic, but mere rules of thought operation. There are three of them:
systematization, unity, and adequacy.
The principle of systematization lays down that reason works and proceeds
only through some system of logic or other. (But I’ve found no available definition
of ‘logic’ in the book). Da Costa explains the principle like this (p. 46): reason has
some game nature, and, accordingly, the rules of the game ought to be explicitly laid
out. Thus I take it that for da Costa logic is the set of the rules of the rational game,
which probably means that logic concerns itself more with inference rules (conceived
of as — relatively at least — conventionally chosen for the sake of a thought game
which we cannot give up) than with logical truths or theses (da Costa says, on p.
157, that finding inference rules in a wide sense is ‘the ultimate purpose of logic’;
true, he also says, on p. 20, that logic is much more than a theory of valid
inferences; whether those apparently conflicting statements constitute one of the
incongruities candidly avowed by da Costa himself I don’t know; but I take it that,
anyway, the theory of inference, in a large sense, is the core of logic for him).
The principle of unity lays down that, in any given context, just one system
of logic can be used. So, even if there are sundry systems of logic, each of them
having its point and its legitimate use in some context or other, no clash or chaotic
mingle of alternative logical systems can be allowed once it comes to coping with
some definite problems in a definite research environment.
The principle of adequacy lays down that the logical system chosen in a
given situation ought to be the one that befits the situation best. This principle puts
a limit on the game character of human reason: we are not altogether free in
choosing the system of logic we want to use; for, experience as well as pragmatic
factors comp el us to choose a particular system out of a gamut of systems. Those
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pragmatic factors seem able to be subsumed under the principle of thought economy
or simplicity, which is in turn what justifies the principle of adequacy itself.
Even though, according to da Costa, those three principles are the only
permanent features of reason — and, moreover, somewhat vague ones at that — they
might eventually be waived, without loss of rationality. What can be asserted on that
score is that we have thus far found no alternative to them, and, therefore,
relinquishing them would bring about a far-fetched or bizarre science (p. 48). I take
it that, for da Costa, what would be wrong in a bizarre ‘science’ would be that it
would fly in the face of deeply engrafted or ingrained wonts, without which we
nowadays don’t know how to proceed.
Within the moving range marked out by those three principles, nothing is
fixed. Patterns of rationality are changing; however, we in principle ought to comply
with those in operation in our environment, unless there provably are greater
advantages ensuant upon replacing them with others. (Let me put in an objection:
with which patterns are we to comply then proving the greater advantages of patterns
of rationality different from the ones that have hitherto been enacted within our
milieu?)
Against such a pragmatist and probably relativistic background, intuitivism
would be hardly to be expected, but da Costa’s somehow eclectic philosophy of
logic has many a string in its fiddle; thus, we find throughout the book a defence of
a ‘dialectisized’ intellectual intuition (in a sense of ‘dialectisize’ to be explained
shortly).
In fact, in what we have set forth as yet, some link seems to be needed, in
order to bind the empirical material with the three metalogical principles, or we shall
incur an infinite regress: if we justify some theses or inference-rules on the base of
their resulting from application of the three metalogical principles to the extant
experience, how can we justify the very claim that those theses and inference-rules
result from application of the three metalogical principles to the extant experience?
Da Costa could have sidestepped the difficulty through a bold leap, but he seems to
jib at doing so. Intuition is then needed: we know such theses as our intellectual
intuition shows to be true, and such inference-rules as it shows to be valid or truth-
preserving.
Admittedly, intuitivism and intuitionism are only accidental bedfellows (a
coherentist constructivism, rid of the doctrine of intellectual intuition, could be
bolstered up with arguments nowise contemptible from a largely verificationist
viewpoint — and verificationism, however largely conceived, is the core of a
constructivist view of logic; on the other hand, most advocates of intellectual
intuition spurn constructivism). Still, da Costa’s upholding intellectual intuition as
an epistemological base and criterion in logic brings him closer to intuitionism.
Da Costa assesses the controversies pursued inside the intuitionist movement
between followers of orthodox Brouwerianism and people such as Griss and Essenin-
Volpin who stand up for a stricter variety of intuitionism. Da Costa agrees with
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those ultra-intuitionists that Brouwerian mathematics does not rely on intuition such
as it really takes place, but on a fairly idealized intuition. He contends, though, that
‘an intuition at least as wide as the intuitionist one turns out indispensable for formal
sciences’ (p. 57), and, accordingly, ought to be accepted in virtue of the principle of
adequacy, even though for some particular purposes and contexts ultra-intuitionism
remains a useful logical approach.
Da Costa makes much of intellectual intuition and devotes much space to
canvassing issues related thereto. However, as he sees it, the intellectual intuition
available in logic and mathematics is formal rather then material (pp. 190-1); which
means that what we grasp through intellectual intuition is, not an object, not even
a categorical proposition, but only an hypothetical one. This is of course a new
version of a Russellian view. The main difficulty surrounding the Russellian view
is that many theorems of mathematics and logic don’t have the form ‘If p, then q’.
Still, such an objection doesn’t arise concerning da Costa’s conception of intuition
— since he could easily reply that not every theorem of logic and mathematics is
intuitively grasped as true. For, da Costa says (p. 19) that logic and mathematics
originate in an interaction between formal intuition and language, an interaction
which is furthermore conditioned — but only genetically and heuristically — by
empirical sciences. The arguments put forward by da Costa in support of the
existence of intellectual intuitions seem to me weak. One of them is (p. 225) that
without immediate knowledge there could be no mediate one. I deem that claim
challengeable. The other argument is a Cartesian point: even an inference process
is made up by steps, each of them being an immediate or intuitive grasping of the
consequence. This claim, too, can be either disputed or, at least, duly qualified, so
as to make intuition needless. An inference is a mental act or operation, something
one performs. It consists in passing or shifting from asserting, or entertaining, state-
ments making up a set of premises to asserting, or entertaining, another statement,
which is the conclusion. Admittedly, that passage or shift is not a belief, even though
it can legitimately be carnet out only if one believes that, if all the premises are
truthfully assertible, so is the conclusion, too. Therefore, the passage in question is
not an intuitive grasping of anything; for, a grasping is, I reckon, an act by which
one asserts something while at the same time purportedly seeing that that something
is true. As for the belief that the inference holds — that is, that the rule is sound or
valid, and that it has been correctly applied (or, in other words, that, if the
conjunction of the premises is truthfully assertible, so is the conclusion) —, that belief
may be bolstered up with other reasonings, instead of being intuitively grasped as
true. That by pursuing such a line of thought we are ultimately faced either with
infinite regress (never completed, of course) or else with a circle (which only
question-beggingly would be styled ‘vicious’) by no means invalidates that process
insomuch as we have given up any hope for radical justification.
Furthermore, the intellectual intuition da Costa postulates is worked over,
furbished, revamped time and again (cf. p. 224). Its justification power lies, not just
in evidence, but in resistance to criticisms. Thus, da Costa’s intuitivism is, in a way,
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of a quasi-coherentist or non-foundationalist cast; for, what according to him justifies
our asserting a mathematical, or logical, statement is not just this statement’s being
intuited as true, but its being so intuited in spite of strenuous attempts at having it
undergo apparently cogent criticisms and at replacing it with some alternative or
other.
However, if all that is the case, is there really something deserving the title
of ‘intuition’? What makes it different from mere conviction? For, if there is any
difference between them, the difference is to be found in that intuition, should it
exist, would be an immediate contact with the object, bearing a warrant for
assertability ‘on its sleeve’. Moreover, since da Costa is prepared to agree that
evidence does not justify a theory on its own, why not require that, in order to be
rendered justifiably assertible, with respect to some given background, the theory
under consideration should be both fruitful to and coherent with a more far-reaching
system, yielding observation statements — i.e. with science either as a whole or,
anyway, as encompassing at least some empirical disciplines? Da Costa cannot
accept that; for, according to him, logical and mathematical statements are, as such,
wholly independent of experience and of empirical reality or knowledge.
My final comment on da Costa’s pragmatism is that, by laying it down, he
incurs an obvious circle: he bears out the three pragmatic principles with an
argument showing that, without them, we should go irrational; and he takes for
granted that we mustn’t go irrational. Still, the argument itself undoubtedly needs
further premises and further rules of inference. Should they be justified in turn by
application of the pragmatic principle to the experience and to a body of beliefs
whose truth is taken for granted (an application which needs some inference-rules,
too, in order to yield any conclusion), then we obviously would enter a circle. But,
if we tare to accept circular justification — which doesn’t entail circular arguments,
each argument remaining non circular, even if the chain they make up is circular —,
then why are pragmatic considerations of paramount importance? For, beyond those
considerations, a deeper issue arises: what is the objective ground for those
principles? What is there in reality that makes it necessary for us to hew to those
principles if we want to reach knowledge, i.e. to reflect reality? But that leads us to
the relationship between thought and reality.
§3. — Logic and reality
Da Costa regards the epistemological status of logical theses as twofold. On
the one hand, they are formal truths, independent of experience, which, in order for
them to be true, depend only on their being proved within a particular formal system
(syntactical approach) or, whenever possible, on their holding in all models of that
system (semantical approach). On the other hand, those theses are also scientific
hypotheses about reality (cf. pp. 112, 113 ff.), and, as such, they are not relative to
formal systems or models thereof, but they are as uncertain as any other empirical
hypotheses may be. Considered as hypotheses about reality, their assertion relies on
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induction (da Costa says that there is on that score a difference of degree rather than
nature). I find very puzzling, though, that, while saying all that, da Costa goes on
to claim that, as empirical hypotheses, logical principles are ‘game rules’ (p. 114):
Is a!l science made up by game rules? Overwhelming difficulties, I daresay, are
heaped on a position like that.
What da Costa seems to mean is that every natural law, even if true, has a
limited range or scope, beyond which it does not hold; this is why by ignoring that
limitation, we use it like a game rule. and the same holds, he thinks, as regards
logical laws, such as the identity principle, which cannot be countenanced in general,
unless we resort to a substantialist metaphysics (see pp. 115 ff). Da Costa alleges
Schrodinger’s claim that identity cannot be applied to elementary particles. and I
take it that, according to da Costa, even within the limited range wherein they hold,
scientific — and hence also logical — laws do not exactly reflect reality ‘as such’, but
are mere approximations thereto, which owe much to the subject’s a priori cognitive
structures — which nevertheless vary from a period to another.
Still, if the epistemological status of logical laws as regards empirical reality
is rather flabby or shaky, da Costa grants them a steadier — albeit by no means
wholly un-problematic — status with respect to a realm of nonempirical or ‘abstract’
entities.
Da Costa bolsters up the claim that there are abstract entities with two
arguments. The first one is a straightforward use of Quine’s criterion (in one of its
versions): when we say that there exist prime numbers greater than 10, we commit
ourselves to postulating the existence of numbers. ‘To deny that much would be
dishonest’ (p. 188). Even though I wholeheartedly agree with that claim, I should
like to have found in the book a more thorough discussion of the issue, and
particularly an assessment of substitutional reading proposals.
Da Costa’s second argument buttressing up his defence of abstract entities
is that once a system of axioms — and inference-rules as well, I suppose — has been
laid down, we are, willy-nilly, compelled to accept whatever ensues thereon,
regardless of whether we like it or not. ‘Hence it seems reasonable to acknowledge
that something exists beyond the axioms’ (p. 189) something whose being so and so
compels us to assert the theorems. Mathematics — da Costa goes on to say — is a
game, but a game that, once its rules have been established, we cannot change at
will. I think there’s much to that argument; still, it seems to me unsatisfactory. That
we in honesty cannot but assert a theorem which can be proved from some axioms
through some inference rules once we have asserted those axioms, bound ourselves
to those rules, and ascertained that the proof is correct does not by itself show that
something or other corresponds to the theorem under consideration, and is or
behaves as the theorem says. For one thing, we can devise inferential rules without
any meaning whatever. For another, what solely follows from our being in honesty
unable to change the theorems at choice is that, if the axioms are truthfully
assertible, and if the inference rules preserve truthful assertability, then the theorems,
too, are true. However, as it stands, da Costa’s argument yields the conclusion that
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any deductive system’s theorems are true of some entities. This of course tallies with
his ontological relativism: there are in fact infinitely many realms or spheres of
abstract entities, and each complete deductive system would reflect one of them.
Now, if that is true, every system’s theorems are false unless the system’s bound
variables and quantifiers are read as if they were ranging only over entities belonging
to the realm reflected by the system in question; which seems to be extremely
untoward and make a theory thus interpreted a set of mere truisms. Any coherent
theory will be true — true, that is, of its own objects —, but no theory will be true
tout court, true of any object. All domains of quantification will perforce be
restricted. For, needless to say, for any theorem of any given theory, you can set up
a coherent deductive system wherein the overnegation of that theorem (i.e. the result
of prefixing to the theorem the overnegation functor: ‘It’s not at all the case that’)
is a theorem.
Furthermore, are those purportedly abstract entities related to the concrete
things which make up the empirical world? Which of them are and which of them
are not? Do es that relationship — whenever it exists — bear on the usefulness of
some formal systems for setting up and developing empirical science? Da Costa says
(on p. 26) that many mathematical theories are not directly tied up with sense
experience. But I think he is bound to make a much stronger claim, to wit: that most
mathematical theories — as he regards them — are neither directly nor indirectly
related to experience. But then, what ground is there for us to say that such abstract
entities as are wholly unrelated to concrete ones — and whose study nowise bears on
empirical science — exist all the same?
What is more, if — as da Costa contends — we only know those abstract
entities through intellectual intuition, and intellectual intuition is — as he claims —
formal, rather than material, then, I reckon, all we know about ‘them’ is that, if they
exist and are so and so, as the axioms say, they also have whatever characteristics
the theorems say ‘they’ have.
Da Costa’s platonism is doubly qualified. The first qualification makes da
Costa’s peculiar platonism idealistic: not only is any theory true relatively to some
particular domain of entities alone, but that domain’s existence seems in turn to be
relative to the subject that states it. This is why da Costa insistently says that the
objects of our logical and mathematical theories are created by us. I take it that, for
him, those objects exist only insomuch as we postulate them by laying down systems
of axioms which define them implicitly. The second qualification makes da Costa’s
platonism relativistic: abstract objects exist and are what they are relatively not just
to the conceiving subject, but to the theory by dint of postulating which the subject
somehow creates the objects. Accordingly, da Costa’s platonism agrees with the
typical anti-platonist stance of regarding so-called abstract entities as mind-dependent
and theory-dependent.
Furthermore, I find a number of difficulties surrounding da Costa’s
relativistic platonism. First, da Costa’s main ground for arriving at it is his regarding
sets of axioms as implicit definitions. An old controversy on that matter, originating
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in the debate between Frege and Hilbert and pursued by Carnap, Quine, Priest and
others, has, according to may lights, clarified the issue. But I find no discussion of
the topic, or of the arguments put forward by either side, in da Costa’s book. What
could be replied to da Costa on behalf of a Fregean standpoint is that natural
numbers, e.g., are not whatever entities satisfy a set of axioms or theorems. That we
can figure out a great many different ontological reductions of numbers through
alternative proxy functions, and deal with them in a number of conflicting ways,
nowise proves that numbers ‘as such’ — whatever ‘as’ or ‘qua’ phrases may mean,
if they mean anything at all — are indeterminate, or that there are natural numbers
of several kinds — Zermelian, Neumannian, and so on. There are ontological —
metaphysical, if you like — arguments bestowing more or less plausibility upon some
of those accounts and reductions; and we need to assess those arguments’ cogency.
Moreover, were sets of axioms implicit definitions, then there would be no disagree-
ments, e.g., among upholders of alternative set-theories. Yet, there are such
disagreements.
My second ground for taking exception at da Costa’s view on the
relationship between logic and reality is that his own peculiar platonism, in addition
to being idealistic and relativistic, overpopulates reality beyond any manageable
boundaries. For, in accordance to that view, there are Zermelian sets, Neumannian
sets, Quinean (ML) sets, Quinean (NF) sets, fuzzy sets of sundry, unrelated kinds,
and so on and so forth.
My third objection is that I feel sure that in logical systems and straight-
forward extensions thereof, like set-theories, the range of bindable variables is
universal or unrestricted: in ‘everything’, ‘thing’ ranges over entities in general. This
is why no logical system is ontologically neutral; and this is also why logic is useful,
and, as I see it, talk of regional logics — wherein da Costa indulges — is either
mistaken or misleading. Of course we might fail to know which logical principles
are true; however, when we propound a system of logic, we are regarding its
theorems as true, even if we either are not altogether sure they are so or are unable
to substantiate our claim beyond reasonable doubt; but, regarding them as true, we
think that they apply to all and every thing without exception. If I assert the
principle of excluded middle, I’m saying, not that it applies to whatever it applies
to, but that it applies to anything whatever.
§4. — Negation, fuzziness, and paraconsistent logic
In accordance with his pluralistic view of logic, da Costa, who is a
distinguished founder of paraconsistent logic, goes about canvassing paraconsistent
logics and backing them up with philosophical arguments. (Regrettably, though, he
says nothing about fuzzy contradictorial logics and set-theories.)
First, da Costa contends that there are many alternative negations, each of
them being defined through the axioms of a logical system (cf. p. 33, p. 106).
Classical negation is all right, and ought to keep its own role and position; indeed
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da Costa goes much further in defending classical negation: as regards ‘simple
judgments of experience’, classical negation is the only right negation, for on that
lev el all classical principles governing negation hold.
Da Costa contends, though, that, as regards certain abstract objects of some
mathematical theories, there are true contradictions, i.e. mutually contradictory truths.
But he insists that there are no true contradictions within empirical reality. Da Costa
buttresses that claim up by remarking (on p. 109 and again on p. 128) that the
negations correlated with perception judgments are not perceptible themselves; hence
we could set at some contradictory truth only through inference, not by means of
empirical ascertainment. This is, da Costa claims, why all purported real contradic-
tions are open to exception. I disagree. We perceive negative states of affairs as well
as positive ones. I see that there is no book on the bed, or that my cat is not brown.
Da Costa replies (on p. 128) that what I perceive is that my cat is black, e.g. whence
I draw the conclusion that he is not brown. I remain unconvinced. Which are the
‘positive’ states of affairs that I perceive when I find out that there are no noises, or
that no birds are now flying before my window? Of course, something or other can
be contrived as an answer to any such question. But such answers would anyway be
at least as controversial as my perceiving a so-called negative fact — i.e. a fact which
is denoted by a negative statement. When I go about finding out whether there are
birds flying before my window, and I see that there is none, I may have failed to
notice which other things are now to be seen before my window. Let’s consider, as
another example, a sorites case: I see that the man yonder is not bald and I also see
that he is not not bald. In that connection, it’s worth taking into account what da
Costa has to say about fuzzy systems: for him (see p. 130), fuzziness or vagueness
is not an objective feature of the world, but arises from the relationships we enter
into with the environment. That claim does once more betoken da Costa’s nonrea-
listic slant. Now, the same thing might be contended about apparently nonfuzzy
features of the world. Knowing a man’s baldness, or a house’s bigness involves
neither more nor less subjective moulding elements than knowing the man’s having
exactly 1008 hairs or the house’s being exactly 8341 mm high. Yet, what we usually
report to have seen is a fuzzy fact. As regards everyday experience, fuzzy properties,
rather than crisp ones, serve to characterize the objects of perception. Still, da Costa
claims (on p. 130) that in everyday experience there’s no vagueness, or else it can
be dodged. I think he is right on the second point: fuzziness could be skirted by
substituting crisp properties for fuzzy ones. However, the price would be high. Most,
if not all, of our everyday experience reports would become meaningless. This
argument is an epistemological one, but it has an ontological bearing, if we wonder
why our ordinary experience reports are useful: either they reflect the world, and
then there are fuzzy situations, or else they don’t reflect it at all; supposing there to
be no objective fuzziness, and no degrees of truth, it would be senseless to say that,
by reporting that the house is ten metres high, I happen to be nearer the truth than
by reporting it to be six metres high, supposing the house is nine metres high: the
mere notion of approximation to the truth would become void and idle; for, if ‘being
ten metres high’ is understood as ‘being exactly ten metres high’, as a crisp predicate
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that anything either definitely and completely satisfies or else doesn’t satisfy at all,
then by making the former statement I am as far from the truth as by making the
latter one. My second argument against dodging fuzzy reports is that, if we hold a
realistic view of sets and faces, we are unavoidably faced with this question: what
faces, and what sets, exist? Is tallness a set (or property)? Or there is no such
property at all, there being, instead, only properties such as being-1814-mm-tall and
the like? Nevertheless I agree that, were we to regard sets and faces as mere fictions
— were we to make do with virtual sets and ‘virtual faces’ alone —, then choosing
either fuzzy or crisp predicates would be a matter of convenience; but, if there are
sets, or faces, or both, then even pragmatic choices of certain predicates instead of
others are to be explained and retraced to their ontological grounds.
Surprisingly, though, da Costa almost admits, in a couple of passages, that
there is objective fuzziness: he quotes (on p. 144) a well-known discussion by
Rosser and Turquette, and goes on to contend that in some cases we seem unable
to overcome indeterminacy, so as to say, e.g., of something either definitely that it
is inside a room, or definitely that it is outside. In another passage (on p. 217), da
Costa says that in a continuum of colours there is a fringe such that we cannot either
say that it is red or say that it is not red; we certainly can reduce the fringe’s span,
but we are unable to eliminate it. So, da Costa seems after all to concede that there
is objective vagueness even at the macroscopic lev el of everyday experience.
Whence he concludes that in some cases the principle of excluded middle fails. I
want to make several comments on those passages.
First, I don’t find da Costa’s argument in support of objective fuzziness
cogent: such as cleave to crisp or classical approaches may retort that that pointed
inability is ours only instead of its stemming from the nature of the world.
(Admittedly, that reply wouldn’t carry conviction, according to da Costa’s lights,
since he regards objects of knowledge, and even reality, as somehow constructed by
human reason; cf. p. 215 and passim; still, what that shows is that da Costa’s
acceptance of objective or real fuzziness is to be taken cum grano salis: what,
according to him, is fuzzy is not the thing itself, as it is independently or our
knowing it, but the object of knowledge somehow produced by us.)
My second, more important, comment is that the existence of fuzzy
situations does not necessarily entail failure of the principle of excluded middle; it
doesn’t entail that failure unless we add an additional premise: that only what is
altogether (i.e. entirely, wholly, one hundred percent) true is true. Such premise is
the principle of maximisation, and the claim that it’s true is alethic maximalism. Da
Costa seems to hold on to alethic maximalism, and this is why he says (e.g. on p.
111) that all many-valued logics give up excluded middle. But not all of them do.
Such many-valued logics as designate sufficiently many truth-values keep the
principles of excluded middle and noncontradiction, as well as abduction (i.e.
Clavius’). Among such logics, incidentally, are several systems studied by da Costa
himself together with I. d’Ottaviano, and with Kotas. Diametrically opposed to
alethic maximalism is the endorsement rule which I’ve shored up with a number of
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arguments in several papers, to wit: It’s, to some extent or other, true that p p. For,
what is more or less true is true (not necessarily wholly true). In other words;
whatever is not altogether false is true (just true; I’m not saying entirely true).
Owing to the endorsement rule, we can have both fuzzy sets and excluded middle
as well as noncontradiction. Therefore, fuzziness neither is nor entails indeterminacy.
(Going back to my sorites example: I see that the man yonder is bald and I also see
that he is not bald — that follows from my former report due to involutivity of weak
negation —, since I see that to some extent he’s bald and I see that to some extent
he’s not bald. Thus, fuzziness entails, not failure of excluded middle, but both
excluded middle, as well as noncontradiction, and some true contradictions.)
My third comment is that, consequently, a satisfactory logic underlying a
fuzzy-set theory must be paraconsistent, i.e. such that it allows the presence of both
a sentence and its negation without that presence leading to triviality (this is da
Costa’s term) or deliquescence (as I’d like to put it), i.e. to every wff being a
theorem of the resulting theory. Da Costa says (on p. 222) that fuzzy-set theory may
become a field of application of paraconsistent logics. I agree. But why? Should
fuzziness be equated with indeterminacy, we should need a logic without excluded
middle and nothing else.
My fourth comment is that paraconsistency or even acceptance of true
contradictions nowise compels us to reject the principle of noncontradiction.
Rejecting a sentence is different from negating it. To negate a sentence is to assert
the sentence’s negation (more accurately: asserting another sentence which results
from prefixing a negation functor to the first sentence), whereas to reject a sentence
is to refuse to accept it. However, da Costa suggests (on p. 131 and passim) that,
whenever a contradiction is admitted as true, the principle of noncontradiction is to
be given away. It is not: if we countenance degrees of truth — and hence also of
falseness —, we can admit sentences which are both true (to some extent or other)
and yet also false (in some degree at least, however small): such instances of the
principle of noncontradiction as have true negations are false, but also true. Thus,
all contradictions are false, even if at the same time some contradictions are
somewhat true. (Incidentally, the same holds as regards the principle of identity;
instead of giving up the very notion of identity for elementary particles, as da Costa
suggests, it would be far better to admit that some things are both identical to
themselves and, at the same time and at least to some extent, not identical to
themselves.)
My fifth comment is that, if we are to account for comparative constructions
— as da Costa suggests on p. 163 — through a fuzzy logical system, then the obvious
course is to regard any difference of degree as a difference in degree of truth.
Accordingly, acceptance of fuzziness leads us to accepting degrees of truth (not of
proximity to truth or any other makeshift).
My last comment is that, once we accept both degrees of truth and the
endorsement rule, we can have both a fuzzy negation (like Łukasiewicz negation),
which is a weak or natural negation, and a strong negation or overnegation (classical
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negation), to be read as ‘not at all’ or ‘nowise’: all classical theorems remain valid
for strong negation, and therefore we ought to reject any overcontradiction, i.e any
formula of the form ‘p and it’s not at all the case that p’.
Moreover, I don’t think da Costa goes far enough in recognizing the range
of fuzzy predicates, which in my opinion covers not just most of our everyday
experience, but — as has been revealed by recent research in the field of fuzzy
systems and applications thereof — many scientific are as: evolution can be
satisfactorily accounted for only within a fuzzy-set theory; fuzzy approaches are by
now thriving in are as such as medicine or geography, let alone in social sciences.
(As for philosophy, the present writer has, in a number of papers, outlined a system
of fuzzy ontology: existence itself as well as many other metaphysical notions can
fruitfully be regarded as fuzzy properties.) and much more is in the offing.
Interestingly, all those researches open the door to applications of paraconsistent
logic, of which da Costa has been one of the pioneers.
Conclusion
I, of course, have not aimed, is this brief commentary, at discussing all
interesting topics in da Costa’s book. There remain lots of insightful considerations
and developments to be gone into. Many enlightening comments are devoted to
issues such as incompleteness theorems, formal and informal semantics, paradoxes,
alternative logics, Quine’s latter view of logic, Aristotle’s defence of the principle
of noncontradiction and Łukasiewicz’s interpretation thereof, and so on. Moreover,
I’m afraid my criticisms may have unjustly overshadowed this engaging book’s
outstanding merits; the reader will find a great many thought-inspiring suggestions
and remarks. I warmly recommend all researchers interested in philosophy of logic
to read it. The book deserves an English translation in order for it to reach a larger
audience.
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